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Significant 1985 Regulatory and Legislative
Developments
By the Subcommittee on Annual Review*
SEC PROXY REVIEW PROGRAM
With adoption of new Form S-4, which simplifies the process of registration
and proxy solicitation in connection with business combinations, and with the
proposed revisions to update and simplify the proxy rules, the SEC has nearly
completed the proxy review program begun in 1982. The SEC program has
already resulted in the adoption of a uniform regulation for the disclosure of
management relationships and transactions, amendments to facilitate share-
holder communications, revisions of SEC regulations on shareholder proposals,
and uniform regulations for disclosure of executive compensation. The principal
task remaining is review of the proxy contests regulations. Proposals for revised
regulations should be issued early in 1986.
Practitioners should note that several new terms have been added to securities
law jargon as the result of the integrated disclosure system, which reduces
duplication of disclosures by permitting incorporation by reference. There is the
"S-1-2-3 approach," which permits "tiering." This means that, depending on
the time that a company has been subject to periodic reporting requirements
under the Exchange Act, and the performance of the obligations imposed upon
it by the Exchange Act and by the terms of its outstanding preferred stock and
debt, the company may be permitted to refer to information filed with the SEC
in other documents instead of repeating it in the registration statement. "Tier-
ing" refers to the fact that a blue-chip company that can incorporate most
information by reference (Form S-3) is in the top tier, and the company that has
to furnish all of the required information in the registration form (Form S-1) is
in the bottom tier.
*Franklin E. Gill, vice-chairman; contributing members: F. Daniel Corkery, David A. Lipton, and
Michael G. Marks.
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REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES IN BUSINESS
COMBINATIONS: NEW FORM S-4
On April 23, 1985, the Commission announced the adoption of Form S-4,1 a
new form used to register securities under the Securities Act in connection with
business combinations. This new form applies the principles of integrated
disclosure to disclosures in merger and exchange-offer transactions. The pur-
pose is to simplify the disclosure of information to securityholders in mergers
and exchange offers so that the former bulky prospectuses and proxy statements
will no longer be necessary. This action implements the recommendation of the
SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, which was intended to make
exchange offers as easy as cash offers in taking over another company by
reducing the complexity of documenting an exchange offer.2 Adoption of new
Form S-4, however, does not permit an exchange offer to be commenced before
the registration becomes effective, an additional recommendation of the SEC
Advisory Committee not yet implemented.
3
The new Form S-4 can be used to register securities in transactions of the
kind specified in rule 145(a);4 mergers in which state law does not require
approval or consent of all the securityholders; exchange offers made to securi-
tyholders of another issuer; and reoffers or resales of securities registered on this
form. It replaces Form S-14 and Form S-15, which were originally adopted on
an experimental basis as part of the first phase of the Commission's integrated
disclosure system. Form S-4 permits use of the principles underlying the
integrated disclosure system in all business combinations, not just those involv-
ing small transactions. In addition, the same streamlined disclosure require-
ments are applicable to business combinations whether effected by a merger or
an exchange offer.
By using the S-1-2-3 approach in Form S-4, the Commission confirmed its
basic premise that decisions made in business combinations are substantially the
same as those made in the purchase of a security in the primary or trading
market. Based on this premise, the integrated disclosure system specifies the
manner in which information must be made available to investors. Under
Forms S-2 and S-3, transaction information must be presented in the prospec-
tus, but company-oriented information may be incorporated by reference de-
pending on the extent to which the Exchange Act reports containing that
information have been disseminated in the market. Registrants who use Form
S-3, the most widely followed companies, do not have to include company-
specific information included in Exchange Act reports but may incorporate this
information by reference. Registrants who use Form S-2, less widely followed
1. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6578, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 21,982, 6 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 72,418 (Apr. 23, 1985).
2. SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, Report of Recommendations (Recommendation
11), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. No. 1028 (CCH) 21 (July 15, 1983).
3. Id., Recommendation 12.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1985). Rule 145 transactions include certain reclassifications, mergers,
consolidations, and transfers of assets.
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reporting companies, must present certain company information either by
delivering the annual report to securityholders or by reiterating that level of
company information in the prospectus. Finally, registrants who use Form S-1
must present all company information in the prospectus.
Form S-4, like other Securities Act forms, is divided into two parts. Part I is
the information that must be included in the prospectus, and part II is the
information that does not have to be included. Part I of the form is divided into
four sections addressing the transaction, the registrant, the company being
acquired, and voting and management information.
Section A pertains to the transaction. This information must be presented in
the prospectus, not incorporated by reference.' Included in section A are items 1
and 2, information called for by items 501 and 502 of regulation S-K; item 3,
risk factors and ratio of earnings to fixed charges as required by item 503 of
regulation S-K, and other information; item 4, terms of the transaction, such as
the terms of the acquisition agreement, and reason for and consequences of the
transaction; item 5, pro forma financial information; item 6, material contracts
with the company being acquired; item 7, additional information concerning
resales; item 8, the interests of named experts and counsel as required by item
509 of regulation S-K; and item 9, indemnification for Securities Act liabilities
as specified by item 510 of regulation S-K.
Section B requires information about the registrant depending upon whether
the registrant is eligible to use Form S-I, Form S-2, or Form S-3. If the
registrant is subject to either section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the Exchange Act,
it is required to present the same information about itself as that required by
Form S-I, Form S-2, or Form S-3 in making a primary securities offering. If
the registrant is not subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act,
the registrant is required to disclose information about itself at the Form S-1
level.
Section C specifies what information to present about the company being
acquired. If the company being acquired is a reporting company, Form S-4
requires the same information about the company being acquired as if that
company were the registrant. Thus, for a Form S-2 or Form S-3 company being
acquired, the registration may incorporate by reference to the documents filed
by the acquired company with the SEC. If the company being acquired is not a
reporting company, Form S-4 allows the registrant to elect to disclose informa-
tion about the company being acquired at either the Form S-1 level or at the
5. Included in § A are: items 1 and 2, information called for by items 501 and 502 of regulation
S-K; item 3, risk factors and ratio of earnings to fixed charges as required by item 503 of regulation
S-K, and other information; item 4, terms of the transaction, such as acquisition agreement, and
reason for and consequences to the transactions; item 5, pro forma financial information; item 6,
material contracts with the company being acquired; item 7, additional information concerning
resales; item 8, the interests of named experts and counsel as required by item 509 of regulation
S-K; and item 9, indemnification for Securities Act liabilities as specified by item 510 of regulation
S-K.
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same level as that required under Form S-15 for nonreporting companies being
acquired.
Section D requires voting and management information. If a proxy, consent,
or authorization is to be solicited, the registrant is required to present informa-
tion in the prospectus concerning the vote needed for approval, dissenters' rights
of appraisal, revocability of proxies, persons making the solicitation, and the
registrant's relationship with the independent public accountants. If a solicita-
tion is not made, Form S-4 requires that the registrant provide information in
the prospectus about the date of the shareholder meeting, the vote required for
approval, dissenters' appraisal rights, and the registrant's relationship with
independent accountants, and a statement that proxies, consents, or authoriza-
tions are not being solicited. Whether or not proxies are solicited, Form S-4 also
requires information on voting securities and the principal holders' and infor-
mation about both entities' directors and officers, executive compensation, and
certain relationships and related transactions.7
Part II of Form S-4 requires information called for by item 702 of regulation
S-K, regarding indemnification of directors and officers; by item 602 of regula-
tion S-K, on exhibits; and by item 512 of regulation S-K, on undertakings. This
information does not have to be in the prospectus but must be in the registration
statement.
If incorporation by reference is used instead of presenting the information in
the prospectus, the prospectus must be sent at least twenty business days in
advance of the date of the shareholder meeting or the date of the final invest-
ment decision. If the registrant wants to proceed at a faster pace, it can do so,
but it must present the same information in the prospectus as is required by
Form S-1.
Although Form S-1 continues to be available for mergers and exchange
offers, Forms S-2 and S-3 have not been and will not be available for such
transactions. Form S-4 now provides the opportunity for incorporation by
reference to registrants qualified to use Forms S-2 and S-3. Form S-4 also is
available to an issuer for exchange offers with its own securityholders.
Not everyone is happy with this step in the SEC's proxy review program. In
a letter addressed to the Commission before adoption of the new form, the
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) observed:
The NAM believes the effect of integration of exchange offers will be to
offset the balance which has evolved over many years between raiders
employing the tender offer method of acquisitions for control of targets.
The SEC readily acknowledges that integration of exchange offers will
result in the acceleration of the tender offer process. Acceleration clearly
6. See item 5 of schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1985).
7. See items 401, 402, and 404 of regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401, 229.402, 229.404
(1985).
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tilts the process to favor the raider side. Such changes could have dramatic
consequences .... 8
COMPREHENSIVE "SUNSET" REVIEW OF THE
PROXY RULES
On July 1, 1985, the Commission published proposed revisions to update and
simplify the Exchange Act proxy rules.9 The principal substantive revisions
streamline the proxy disclosure system by applying the principles of integrated
disclosure to proxy and information statements and enhance investor protection
by requiring additional disclosure relating to independent public accountants.
The proposed revisions affect regulation 14a, including schedules 14A and 14B;
regulation 14C; regulation S-K; and Form S-18.
Under rule 14a-1, the Commission proposes to add a definition of "record
date" and to revise the definition of "solicitation." Under the proposal, the
record date would be defined in accordance with state law. The definition of
"solicitation" would be revised to conform with case law.1" Thus, a solicitation
would be expanded from a communication "reasonably calculated to result in"
to a communication "which reasonably could be expected to affect" the procure-
ment, withholding, or revocation of a proxy. For a long time, the SEC has
posited that almost any communication with securityholders prior to a contem-
plated meeting is a proxy solicitation. But the revision would provide additional
authority for the Staff's extremely broad interpretation. The Staff does not
enumerate in either existing regulations or the proposed revision what factors
will be considered. The SEC noted that, in the case law defining "solicitation,"
an important factor in determining whether the communication has such effect
is the length of time between the making of the communication and the taking of
such vote. The shorter the time, the greater the effect on the proxy process.
However, the Staff did not follow through by suggesting guidelines for commu-
nications that would not be treated as solicitations if made substantially in
advance of meetings.
Regulation 14a-2, entitled "Solicitations to Which Rules 14a-3 to 14a-12
Apply," actually lists solicitations to which those rules do not apply. The only
proposed revision to rule 14a-2 involves a plan for reorganization under the
bankruptcy law. Under a proposed revision to paragraph (a)(4), rule 14a-2
would not apply to a solicitation made after court approval of a written
disclosure statement concerning a plan of reorganization filed under chapter 11
of the bankruptcy laws.
Under rule 14a-3, before a solicitation can be made, securityholders must be
furnished with a proxy statement; if the solicitation relates to the annual
8. Letter from H.A. Vine, on behalf of NAM, to SEC (Aug. 24, 1984).
9. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6592, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,195, [Current]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,901 (July 1, 1985).
10. Dyer v. SEC, 291 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1961); SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943), as
cited in SEC Securities Act Release No. 6592, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,195, [Current]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,901 n.30 (July 1, 1985).
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election of directors, an annual report must also be provided.11 The Commission
proposes to revise paragraph (b) of the rule to provide that if a special meeting
is convened to elect directors in lieu of an annual meeting, the securityholders
will be furnished with an annual report in connection with such meeting.
12 The
Staff has also stated throughout the release that proposals applicable to proxy
solicitations would be equally applicable to situations involving consents and
authorizations. For example, paragraph (b) would be revised to clarify that the
annual report must be furnished to securityholders whether the solicitation
involves proxies or consents in connection with the annual election of directors.
In addition, the Commission proposes to revise paragraph (b)(10) to require a
proxy statement to contain an undertaking not only that the registrant will
provide, upon written request, a copy of its annual report on Form 10-K but
also any additional information contained in other documents required by
section 13(a), such as the quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and current reports
on Form 8-K.
The most significant proposed revisions concern integration and the addi-
tional disclosure requirements regarding independent public accountants. Cur-
rently, schedule 14A permits incorporation by reference only of financial
statements included in the annual report.13 Proposed items 11, 12, 13, and 14,
however, would permit incorporation by reference of part or all of the informa-
tion, either pursuant to the tiered S-1-2-3 approach or from an annual report to
securityholders furnished in connection with the same meeting. The additional
information permitted to be incorporated by reference would include the busi-
ness description and the other uniform disclosure items that comprise the basic
information package. In addition, the proxy statement must contain an under-
taking to furnish the incorporated documents upon request when the incorpo-
rated information is not delivered with the proxy statement.
The Commission also is proposing additions to the disclosure requirements of
proposed item 9 concerning independent public accountants. These proposals
would require disclosures concerning peer review and changes of accountants. 4
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS: RULE 14a-8(c)(12)
Six church groups challenged the validity of 1983 revisions of SEC rule
14a-8(c)(12), which permits a company to omit a shareholder proposal from its
proxy statement if substantially the same proposal has already been submitted
to shareholders and received less than specified percentages of votes in its favor.
The 1983 revisions had increased the percentage of votes required, thereby
disqualifying the plaintiffs from resubmitting their proposals. The church
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1985).
12. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6592, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,195, [Current]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,901 (July 1, 1985).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 204.14A-101 (1985).
14. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6592, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,195, [Current]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,901 (July 1, 1985). For further discussion, see infra, "Proposed
Proxy Rules Requiring Disclosure Affecting Accountants."
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groups would have been able to submit their proposals under the prior rule,
however.
The federal court granted the church groups' motion for summary judgment,
holding that the revised rule was invalid because the SEC failed to give
adequate notice and adequate explanation of its proposed action under the
Administrative Procedure Act. The SEC agreed to reinstate the prior rule and
to monitor its effects during the 1986 proxy season. Thus, rule 14a-8(c)(12)
provides once again that a registrant may omit from its proxy material any
shareholder proposal substantially the same as a proposal previously included in
proxy material within the preceding five years, if the proposal had been
submitted only once during that period and received less than three percent of
the total votes cast; or if submitted twice, had received less than six percent of
the total votes cast; or if submitted three or more times, had received less than
ten percent of the total votes cast. 15
PROXY RULES EXTENDED TO BANKS
In December 1985, section 14(b) of the Exchange Act was amended to
authorize the SEC to extend to banks and other financial institutions its rules
governing distribution of proxy materials, whether or not they solicit brokerage
business." The legislation becomes effective December 28, 1986.
The SEC has been concerned that banks, although they hold considerably
more stock than brokerage firms, have not been subject to the same regulations
as registered brokers and dealers. As a partial remedy for this regulatory gap,
the SEC recently adopted regulations requiring registration of banks as broker-
dealers if they solicit brokerage business. (New rule 3b-9 is discussed below.)
The legislation also authorizes the SEC to require banks, like brokerage firms,
to disclose the names of beneficial owners to corporations requesting a list of
their own shareholders, provided that the beneficial owner consents to such
disclosure.
TENDER OFFER DEVELOPMENTS-PROPOSED ALL-
HOLDERS RULE
As the result of litigation growing out of the efforts of Mesa Petroleum
Company to take over Unocal Corporation, the SEC announced that the
Williams Act by implication prohibits an issuer from excluding some of its
shareholders from a tender offer for its own shares. The SEC also proposed a
rule to codify its interpretation: the all-holders rule, which would apply both to
tender offers by third parties and to tender offers by an issuer for its own shares.
In doing so, the Commission sought, in effect, to overrule a federal district court
and the Delaware Supreme Court.
15. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,625, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,937 (Nov.
14, 1985). For discussion of the issues, see United Church Bd. v. SEC, 617 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C.
1985).
16. Shareholder Communication Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-222 (Dec. 28, 1985).
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In defending itself against the hostile takeover, Unocal Corporation offered to
exchange new debt securities valued at $72 for a portion of its outstanding
common stock, a substantial premium over the offer by Mesa of cash and
securities valued at $54 per share. Unocal, however, excluded Mesa from the
offer, even though Mesa then held thirteen percent of Unocal's common stock.
Mesa sought to enjoin the exchange offer in both federal and Delaware
courts. In the federal court action in California, Mesa claimed that the selective
exchange offer violated section 13(e) and section 14(e) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. Mesa argued that SEC proposals requiring tender offers to
be "open to all" supported its interpretation, even though these proposals were
never adopted. The federal court concluded that "Congress never intended to
substantively regulate tender offers and in the face of the SEC's apparent
acceptance of that interpretation, it is unnecessary to debate the cases which are
claimed tangentially to touch on this issue.""
Mesa also sought to enjoin the offer under Delaware law. The Delaware
Supreme Court disagreed with Mesa's position. The court found that the Board
acted in the proper exercise of sound business judgment in determining that the
Mesa offer was inadequate and coercive. Furthermore, the court concluded that
"the selective exchange is reasonably related to the threats posed" and therefore
did not violate the fairness requirements of Delaware corporation law."
The SEC responded with proposed rule makings designed to accomplish two
goals: (i) to conform the regulations governing issuer tender offers to those
governing third-party tender offers and (ii) "to codify the Commission's position
that an issuer tender offer must be open to all holders of.the class of the
securities subject to the tender offer, and that all security holders must be paid
the highest consideration offered to any security holder."'19 The proposed all-
holders rule, which would effectively overrule the Delaware Supreme Court, is
discussed in the SEC release proposing a new rule 14d-10 applicable to third-
party tender offers."0 The Commission, despite the contrary conclusion of the
federal and state courts and despite its failure to adopt earlier proposals of the
all-holders rule, asserts "the all-holders requirement is a widely known and
generally accepted tender offer practice . "... ,,2 Citing sections 13(d), 13(e),
14(d), 14(e), and 14(f) of the Exchange Act, the Commission claims that
17. Unocal Corp. v. Pickins, 608 F. Supp. 1081, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
18. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985).
19. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6596, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,199, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,798 (July 1, 1985).
20. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6595, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,198, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,797 (July 1, 1985).
21. Id. at 87,560. For earlier Commission proposals of an all-holders rule, see SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 14,234, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,380 (Dec. 7,
1977) and SEC Exchange Act Release No. 16,112, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,182 (Aug. 16, 1979), with respect to issuer tender offers regulated under § 13(e). See
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 16,385, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,374 (Nov. 29, 1979), with respect to issuer and third-party tender offers under § 14(e) of the
Exchange Act.
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"implicit in these provisions ... are the requirements that a bidder make a
tender offer to all security holders of the class of securities which is subject to the
offer and that the offer be made to all holders on the same terms . "22
In substance, proposed new rule 14d-10, applicable to third-party offers, and
revised rule 13e-4, applicable to issuer tender offers, would prohibit selective
cash or exchange offers and require payment of the best price, that is, the
highest amount offered at any time during the tender-offer period.
Because of the recent trend of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the Commis-
sion's position led members of the bar and Congress to express serious reserva-
tions about the SEC's authority to promulgate the proposed rules.2" Less than a
month before the SEC proposals were issued, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. that "manipulative acts under § 14(e)
require misrepresentation or nondisclosure." The Court continued:
The purpose of the Williams Act, which added § 14(e) to the Securities
Exchange Act, was to ensure that public shareholders who are confronted
with a tender offer will not be required to respond without adequate
information. Nowhere in the legislative history is there any suggestion that
§ 14(e) serves any purpose other than disclosure, or that the term "manip-
ulative" should be read as an invitation to oversee the substantive fairness
of tender offers .... 24
Although SEC staff members indicated that prompt adoption of the proposed
rules should be expected following the end of the comment period on September
9, 1985, the Commission decided on January 9, 1986, to defer adoption of the
proposal for ninety days. 25 At the same time, the Commission proposed for
public comment a regulation that would permit a corporation to make exclu-
sionary tender offers if approved in advance by its shareholders. In effect, the
22. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6595, supra note 20, at 87,559. See also id. nn. 2 & 3,
at 87,559. Section 13(d) provides for reporting beneficial ownership of more than five percent of
registered equity securities of another company; § 13(e) prohibits an issuer from repurchasing its
own equity securities in violation of SEC regulations adopted to define fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts; § 14(d) requires filing a disclosure form with the Commission before making a
tender offer for more than five percent of the registered equity securities of another company;
§ 14(e) prohibits making material, untrue statements or omissions in connection with a tender offer;
and § 14(f) regulates assumption of control of a board of directors in connection with a tender offer.
23. See Letter from R.M. Phillips and R.T. Lang, on behalf of the ABA Federal Regulation of
Securities Committee, to the SEC (Sept. 9, 1985); Letter from Timothy E. Wirth, Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance, to Chairman
John S.R. Shad, SEC (Oct. 3, 1985); and 131 Cong. Rec. S14,642-43 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1985)
(colloquy concerning the SEC proposals among Senators Spector, Rudman, and D'Amato). Senator
Spector said, "I believe that if the Federal Government is to take the extraordinary step of
modifying State corporate law, it should be by Congress, not the SEC." Senator D'Amato
responded, "In the past, the SEC has promulgated rules that govern the tender offer process and I
do not question their authority to do so in this area. However, I can assure him that the Banking
Committee's Subcommittee on Securities, which I chair, will devote attention to the 'all-holders'
rule."
24. 105 S. Ct. 2458, 2459 (1985).
25. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1986, at D-1, col. 1.
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proposal would give shareholders the option to limit applicability of SEC
regulations to some corporate transactions. Earlier, Senator D'Amato, Chair-
man of the Senate Banking Committee's Subcommittee on Securities, had
already introduced a comprehensive bill that would prohibit the use of exclu-
sionary tender offers. 26 If passed, the proposed bill would supersede the deci-
sions of the Delaware Supreme Court and the Federal District Court in
California discussed earlier.
BROKER-DEALER REGULATIONS
RULE 3b-9: BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION OF
BANKS
The SEC, in a controversial move, adopted rule 3b-9 under the Exchange
Act. New rule 3b-9 requires a bank engaged in certain securities-related
activities to register with the Commission as a broker-dealer. 7 With certain
exceptions, the new rule, which becomes effective January 1, 1986, will require
a bank to register as a broker-dealer if it (i) publicly solicits brokerage business
for which it receives transaction-related compensation; (ii) receives transaction-
related compensation for providing brokerage services to trusts, a managing
agency, or other accounts to which the bank provides advice; or (iii) deals in or
underwrites securities. The major exception provided in the rule is for a bank
that enters into an arrangement with a registered broker-dealer pursuant to
which the broker-dealer will provide the brokerage services (the networking
exception). The rule also provides seven additional exceptions for banks that
engage in certain activities that will not require broker-dealer registration.
The reason given by the Commission for the new rule was its concern that,
due to dramatic expansion in the scope of securities activities now engaged in by
banks and the number of banks involved, these activities were not covered by the
rules and regulations designed by the SEC and the self-regulatory organizations
to assure investor protection and promote fair and orderly markets. Banks are
no longer merely accommodating existing customers but are engaged in activi-
ties functionally indistinguishable from those offered by registered broker-
dealers. The Commission did not believe that existing and proposed rules
offered by the banking industry were sufficiently broad to achieve complete
functional regulation.
26. S. 1907, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S17,096-17,102 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1985). The
proposed bill would also (i) prohibit large open-market purchases of a target company's stock after
the bidder withdraws its tender offer; (ii) require bidders who acquire five percent of a company's
stock to report their holdings to the SEC within 24 hours, rather than 10 days, and wait two
business days before resuming stock purchases, thereby closing the 10-day window; (iii) extend the
minimum offering period for tender offers from 20 business days to 30 calendar days, and to 40
calendar days for partial and two-tier tender offers; (iv) prohibit golden parachutes during takeover
attempts; and (v) prohibit the payment of greenmail unless all shareholders were offered the same
premium above market price or the majority of shareholders approved the repurchases.
27. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,205, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,800 (July 1, 1985).
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According to the Commission, the new rule will not affect existing arrange-
ments between banks and broker-dealers whereby the bank advertises the
broker's services, the broker-dealer performs all the brokerage functions, and
the bank and the broker-dealer share the customer's commissions. When the
bank has internalized certain brokerage functions, however, in connection with
securities transactions, the Commission feels that regulatory concerns are raised.
The first activity to trigger the registration provisions, absent the networking
exception, is the public solicitation of brokerage business with transaction-
related compensation. This provision contemplates a bank that publicly pro-
motes the availability of internalized brokerage services and receives "monetary
profit in excess of cost recovery for brokerage execution services."28
The rule does not define the term "public solicitation." The Commission
stated in the release adopting rule 3b-9 that a bank that does not fit within the
networking exception and that sends out literature to its customers promoting
the availability of its brokerage services or engages in certain other broadly
disseminated advertising of these services will be deemed to be a publicly
soliciting brokerage business.
The networking exception to rule 3b-9 provides that registration as a broker-
dealer is not required of a bank that enters into a contractual or other
arrangement with a registered broker-dealer pursuant to which the broker-
dealer will offer brokerage services either at the bank or at a separate location,
and (i) the broker-dealer is clearly identified as the person performing the
services, (ii) bank employees perform only clerical and ministerial services in
connection with the brokerage activities,29 (iii) bank employees do not receive
compensation for the brokerage activities, and (iv) such services by the broker-
dealer are fully disclosed.
The second activity to trigger the registration requirement is receipt of
transaction-related compensation for providing brokerage services to trust, man-
aging agency, or other accounts to which the bank provides investment advice."
Investment advice includes advice to individuals as well as investment seminars
and certain research disseminated generally to covered accounts. In adopting
this provision, the Commission felt that generating profits from transactions that
require investment discretion or providing investment advice to the covered
accounts presents the possibility, as with broker-dealers, of sales practices
inconsistent with the protection of investors' interests. Its rules, and those of the
self-regulatory organizations, will supplement banking regulation of these
transactions.
In an effort not to impinge unnecessarily on traditional trust activity of banks,
the Commission has excepted certain transactions from the coverage of the
28. Rule 3b-9, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,385 (1985) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9(d)).
29. It is the Commission's position that a registered broker-dealer's handling of customer funds
or securities in connection with securities transactions would not be clerical or ministerial functions.
30. Bank employees may receive such compensation if they are qualified as registered represen-
tatives. Additionally, a portion of the commissions generated by the bank's customers could be paid
to the bank.
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foregoing portion of the rule. Specifically, the rule does not apply if (i) each
customer independently chooses the broker-dealer, (ii) the bank's personnel do
not receive transaction-related compensation based on the number of accounts
that decide to use the registered broker-dealer, and (iii) the executing broker-
dealer carries the account on a fully disclosed basis.
The third activity in the rule to trigger the registration requirement is dealing
in or underwriting securities. The Commission interprets the term "under-
write" to be consistent with the definition of "underwriter" in section 2(11) of
the Securities Act. Therefore, a bank engaging in such activity would be
required to conduct both "best efforts" and "firm commitment" underwriting
through a subsidiary or affiliate registered as a broker-dealer.
Rule 3b-9, in addition to permitting a bank to avoid registration by acting
through a registered subsidiary or affiliate, also sets out a number of exemp-
tions. The rule does not apply to banks that (i) effect transactions in exempt
securities (as defined in the Exchange Act), municipal securities, or in commer-
cial paper, banker's acceptances, or commercial bills; (ii) effect no more than
1000 securities transactions each year; (iii) effect transactions for the investment
portfolios of affiliated companies; (iv) effect transactions as part of a program
for investment or reinvestment of bank deposits and account funds in investment
companies registered pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940; (v)
effect transactions as part of any bonus, profit-sharing, or similar plan for
employees or shareholders; (vi) effect transactions pursuant to sections 3(b),
4(2), and 4(6) of the Securities Act; and (vii) are subject to section 15(e) of the
Exchange Act. In addition, subsection (c) provides that the Commission may
exempt a bank if it determines that the bank's activities, while technically
within the meaning and letter of the rule, are not within the intended purpose of
the rule.
RULE 3a4-1: SAFE HARBOR FROM BROKER-DEALER
REGISTRATION FOR ASSOCIATED PERSONS OF THE
ISSUER
On June 27, 1985, the SEC adopted rule 3a4-1, which provides a nonexclu-
sive safe harbor from broker-dealer registration for certain associated persons of
an issuer." Associated persons of an issuer are defined in the rule as any natural
person who is a partner, officer, director, or employee of the issuer, of a
corporate general partner of a limited partnership that is the issuer, or of a
company or partnership that controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with the issuer, or employees of a registered investment adviser to an
issuer that is an investment company registered under the Investment Company
Act of 1940.32 Under the rule, provided certain conditions are met, these
associated persons will not be considered to be acting as brokers or dealers when
31. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,172, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,792 (June 27, 1985).
32. Rule 3a4-1(c), 50 Fed. Reg. 27,946 (1985) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1).
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they participate in the sale of the issuer's securities and, therefore, will not be
required to register as broker-dealers under section 15 of the Exchange Act.
The Commission adopted this rule to provide guidance for an issuer that
chooses to sell its securities through associated persons.
The rule provides in paragraph (a) that the associated person must meet
three preliminary conditions and any one of three alternative conditions to take
advantage of the safe harbor. The three preliminary conditions are (i) at the
time of participation in the sale, the associated person must not be subject to a
statutory disqualification as that term is defined in section 3(a)(39) of the
Exchange Act; (ii) the associated person must not receive commissions or
transaction-related compensation in connection with the sale of the issuer's
securities; and (iii) the associated person of the issuer must not be an associated
person of a broker or dealer.
To claim the availability of rule 3a4-1, the associated person must also meet
one of three alternative conditions set forth in paragraphs (a)(4)(i)-(iii) of the
rule. The first alternative is available if the associated person restricts his
participation in the offer or sale of securities to any of the following: offers and
sales to various financial institutions and intermediaries, such as registered
broker-dealers; transactions exempt from registration under section 3(a)(7),
section 3(a)(9), or section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act; transactions in connec-
tion with reorganizations, reclassifications, and acquisitions made according to a
plan submitted for the approval of securityholders who will receive securities of
the issuer; or sales pursuant to a pension, profit-sharing, or similar employee
benefit plan or dividend-reinvestment plan.3
The second alternative imposes the following three conditions on associated
persons seeking the rule's exemption: the associated person must perform
substantial duties for the issuer other than in connection with securities transac-
tions; the associated person cannot be a broker or dealer, or an associated person
df a broker or dealer, vithin the preceding twelve months; and the associated
person must not have participated in selling a securities offering for any issuer
within the preceding twelve months other than in reliance on the alternatives
specified in paragraph (a)(4)(i) or paragraph (a)(4)(iii) of the rule. For securi-
ties registered under rule 415 of the 1933 Act, this twelve-month restriction
begins at the end of the rule 415 offering.3
The third alternative is available to associated persons who conduct only
passive sales efforts. Under this alternative, associated persons are permitted to
prepare and deliver any written communications through the mail or by other
means that do not involve the associated person's oral solicitation of a potential
purchaser. The content of the communication, however, must be approved by a
partner, officer, or director of the issuer. Additionally, the associated persons
may respond to inquiries from potential purchasers in conversations initiated by
the purchaser in response to a registration statement filed under the Securities
33. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,172, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,792 (June 27, 1985).
34. Id.
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Act or other offering document. Finally, associated persons may perform minis-
terial or clerical work involved in effecting transactions."
Compliance with the provisions described above is not the only means by
which an associated person may sell the issuer's securities without registering as
a broker-dealer, however. Paragraph (b) of the rule provides that no presump-
tion shall arise that an associated person of the issuer has violated section 15(a)
of the Act solely because his participation in the sale did not meet the conditions
of paragraph (a). 6 The Commission stated that the Staff will continue to
provide interpretive guidance to those activities not clearly specified in the rule. 7
RULE 10b-6: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF
DISTRIBUTION REGULATIONS
In October 1985, the SEC issued a release requesting comments on proposed
amendments to rule 10b-6 under the Exchange Act, " the principal antimanipu-
lation rule regulating the securities transactions of participants in securities
distributions. The proposed amendments cover certain issues, left open by the
1983 amendments, that the SEC believed needed more study and comment,
including solicited brokerage transactions, bids and, purchases by affiliates of
participants in a distribution, the exercise of exchange-traded call options,
clarification of the availability of rule l0b-6 exceptions, and a reformulation of
cooling-off periods within exceptions (a)(3)(xi) and (xii) of the rule.
Subject to certain exceptions, rule lOb-6 prohibits participants engaged in a
distribution of securities, either alone or with others, from bidding for or
purchasing such securities, any security of the same class and series as those
securities, or any right to purchase any such security, until they have completed
their participation in the selling process. The rule also forbids such persons
from inducing others to purchase any security until termination of the distribu-
tion. The rule currently contains thirteen exceptions to its general prohibitions.
These exceptions trace from the time the rule was first adopted in 1955." The
last amendments to rule 10b-6 in 1983 (the 1983 amendments)," among other
things, defined the term "distribution," permitted certain distribution partici-
pants to continue trading securities until the commencement of the applicable
cooling-off period, and also codified many SEC staff interpretive positions
issued over the years.
35. Rule 3a4-1(a)(4)(iii), 50 Fed. Reg. 27,946 (1985) (to he codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1).
36. Id.
37. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,172, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,792 (June 27, 1985).
38. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6607, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,510, [Current]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,924 (Oct. 10, 1985).
39. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5194, [1954-1957 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 76,350 (July 5, 1955).
40. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 19,565, [1982-1983 Transfer Binderl Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,326, (Mar. 4,1983).
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Solicited Brokerage Transactions
The 1983 amendments permitted solicited principal transactions in certain
circumstances, while solicited brokerage transactions remained prohibited from
the time a broker became a participant in the distribution through the end of the
distribution period.4
In the release proposing the latest amendments to rule 1Ob-6, the Commis-
sion cited two reasons for treating principal and brokerage transactions differ-
ently. First, the Commission felt that because principal transactions require the
broker-dealer to put its own capital at risk, this may limit the extent to which
the broker-dealer engages in these transactions. The second reason is that
principal transactions include active market making and block positioning by
the broker-dealer, which provide a liquid market for the security, a benefit to
the investing public and the marketplace. Commentators, however, have stated
that the market impacts of the two kinds of transactions are indistinguishable.
After studying the matter and reviewing the comment letters received, the
Commission stated in its adopting release that the premise underlying the
adoption of the two- and nine-business day cooling-off periods for principal
transactions may also be compatible with solicited brokerage transactions,
"since the market impact of solicited brokerage transactions should dissipate
within the cooling-off periods prescribed in Exception (xi)," thereby discourag-
ing manipulative activity.
Transactions by Affiliates
The 1983 amendments to rule 10b-6 also narrowed the coverage of the rule,
as it related to issuers and selling shareholders, by adding an "affiliated
purchaser" concept and defining that term in the rule. Those amendments did
not, however, narrow the affiliate concept as it related to underwriters, prospec-
tive underwriters, brokers, dealers, or other persons participating or who have
agreed to participate in a distribution (collectively referred to as participants).
As a result, all affiliates of participants remain subject to the provisions of rule
lOb-6 and are prohibited during the cooling-off period from bidding on or
purchasing securities about to be distributed regardless of the business they are
engaged in or the absence of any control relationship with the participant.
The Commission's proposed amendments reflect an effort to define more
precisely the scope of affiliates that the SEC believes have the means and
incentive to facilitate a distribution of securities. At the same time, they
recognize that current corporate structures have resulted in brokerage firms
with affiliates that, because of the business they are in, have no ability or
incentive to condition the market to facilitate a distribution. The rule as
proposed to be amended would therefore apply to any person who (i) directly or
indirectly acts in concert with a distribution participant; (ii) is an affiliate that,
41. As noted by the Commission in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 19,565, id., when either side
of a brokerage transaction is unsolicited, a broker may solicit the other side and still rely on
exception (v) to rule IOb-6.
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directly or ipdirectly, controls the purchases by a distribution participant, whose
purchases are controlled by a distribution participant, or whose purchases are
under common control with those of a distribution participant; (iii) is an
affiliated broker, dealer, investment company, or investment adviser; or (iv) is
an affiliate that otherwise regularly purchases securities, through a broker-
dealer or otherwise, for its own account or for the account of others, or
recommends or exercises investment discretion with respect to the purchase or
sale of securities.
As a result of this proposed change, affiliates of a participant that are not
acting in concert with it and are engaged in a business that does not regularly
involve participation in securities transactions would not be subject to the rule.
Exercise of Exchange-Traded Call Options
Rule lOb-6 currently provides for a five-day cooling-off period applicable to
the exercise of call options by distribution participants. This provision, adopted
with the 1983 amendments to rule lOb-6, reflected the Commission's concern
that these exercises presented a potential for market impact and manipulation.
Because a certain percentage of these call options are uncovered, the Commis-
sion continues to feel that the exercise of call options by a distribution partici-
pant could cause others to purchase in the market securities of the same class
and series as those being distributed. These exercises, the Commission reasons,
would "induce" the option writer to purchase the securities being distributed,
the inducement being a violation of the rule.
Weighing the potential for manipulation against the disadvantage imposed on
participants by the current provisions of the rule, the Commission has proposed
two alternatives and requested comments on its expressed concerns. The first
alternative would eliminate the five-business day cooling-off period and replace
it with a prohibition period that begins upon the commencement of offers of
sales in the distribution. The second alternative would permit distribution
participants to exercise call options throughout the distribution period when the
option position was established prior to the time the person became a partici-
pant in the distribution. When the position is established after the person
became a participant, the five-day period would be retained.
Clarifying the Exceptions to Rule lOb-6
As part of the proposed changes to rule 10b-6, the Commission plans to add
language to the introductory portion of the subsection that delineates the rule's
exceptions and establishes that the exceptions are not available if the transac-
tions involved are done to create actual, or apparently actual, trading in the
security or to raise the price of the security. This proposed change would
reaffirm that the exceptions are not a safe harbor and would specifically except
manipulative conduct from all of them.
4
1
42. Currently, only exceptions (xi) and (xii) of rule 10b-6(a)(3) contain the proposed language.
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RULE 1 Ob-5: DISCLOSURE OF PRELIMINARY MERGER
NEGOTIATIONS
On July 8, 1985, the SEC published a report of an investigation, conducted
pursuant to its authority under section 21(a), concerning the disclosure of
preliminary merger negotiations. 41 In the Commission's opinion, the issuer
violated antifraud provisions when an employee made a statement that there
was no corporate development to account for "unusual market activity" in its
securities while the company was engaged in negotiations that ultimately
resulted in its acquisition. Given the surrounding circumstances, this statement
was materially false and misleading even though the employee, the treasurer,
was unaware of the negotiations.
Under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5, 44 an issuer is
prohibited from making public statements that are false or that fail to include
material facts necessary under the circumstances to make the statement not
misleading. This prohibition applies to all public statements by persons speak-
ing on behalf of the issuer, 45 regardless of whether the issuer was required to
make the statement or made the statement voluntarily.
In its report, the Commission emphasized that whenever the issuer makes a
public statement or responds to an inquiry from a stock exchange concerning
rumors, unusual market activity, possible corporate developments, or any other
matter, that statement must be materially accurate and complete. 6 Information
concerning an acquisition is material and must be disclosed if the information
assumes "actual significance in the deliberation of" and significantly alters "the
total mix of information available to the reasonable shareholder."4 Therefore, if
an issuer makes a statement regarding nonpublic acquisition discussions taking
place, it must disclose "sufficient information concerning the discussions to
prevent the statements made from being materially misleading." 4 A voluntary
statement, even one in reply to an exchange's inquiry or request, denying
information of any corporate development made while the company is engaged
in acquisition discussions, could be materially misleading. If the statement does
not meet the standards for accuracy and completeness embodied in the antifraud
provisions, the company and any person responsible for the statement may be
liable under the federal securities law.49
43. In re Carnation Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,801 (July
8, 1985).
44. SEC Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780); rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
45. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 20,560, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,120B (Jan. 13,
1984).
46. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,801 (July 8, 1985).
47. Id. (quoting ISC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
48. Id.
49. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 20,560, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I 23,120B (Jan. 13,
1984).
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In addition, the SEC, in footnote 8 of its report, expressed its belief that the
Third Circuit wrongly decided the case of Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc." In
Greenfield, the court concluded that a duty to disclose preliminary merger
discussions does not exist until a firm agreement on the price and structure of
the merger has been reached. Absent an indication that privileged information
has been leaked, the issuer's statement that it was "aware of no reason that
would explain the activity in its stock," made while the issuer was engaged in
merger discussions, was not false or misleading.51 The SEC disagrees. In its
release, the SEC states that anytime the issuer speaks, the statements must be
accurate and complete. If the issuer is engaged in merger negotiations and
voluntarily makes a statement, it has an obligation to disclose sufficient informa-
tion to make its statements not misleading.52
The SEC concedes, however, that an issuer that wants to prevent premature
disclosure of nonpublic preliminary negotiations can, in appropriate circum-
stances, respond "no comment" to press inquiries concerning rumors or unusual
marketing activity.53 A no-comment response might be appropriate in situations
in which an agreement has not been reached and the parties believe that
negotiations would be jeopardized by premature disclosure. A no-comment
response would not be appropriate when subsequent events make a previous
statement misleading or when market rumors are attributable to issuer leaks.54
The SEC did not seek to enjoin future violations of the federal securities laws by
Nestle (successor to Carnation, the acquired company).
Some commentators have suggested that this SEC ruling will cause compa-
nies to adopt strong policies favoring no-comment responses and advising their
employees not to make any comments concerning rumors.5 5 Others have sug-
gested that early disclosure of merger negotiations will encourage investors to
speculate imprudently on the outcome of negotiations, a job best left to profes-




Although the Securities Acts Amendments of 197556 were adopted a decade
ago, ripple effects from that landmark piece of legislation continued to domi-
nate, either directly or indirectly, the major market regulatory developments of
1985. The regulatory actions taken in 1985 were not associated with initiating
50. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985).
51. Id. at 759.
52. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,801 (July 8, 1985).
53. 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1229 (1985).
54. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,801 (July 8, 1985).
55. 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1229 (1985).
56. Known as the Securities Reform Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
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or implementing major structural components of the national market system.
Rather, the developments that occurred were, for the most part, reactions to
previously established programs-both refinements to and attempts to equalize
the impacts of earlier developments.
ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE
A market regulatory development with pervasive ramifications for the securi-
ties industry was the New York Stock Exchange's (NYSE) exploration of
modifying its corporate listing requirements to permit listing the securities of
companies that have classes of common stock with differential voting rights. Of
course, state corporation laws generally govern the voting rights of shareholders
and permit dual voting rights.5 7
Since 1926, the NYSE's rules have specified that all common stock of listed
companies must have equal voting rights."8 The NYSE's self-evaluation of
listing requirements was motivated at least in part by two significant develop-
ments. First, currently listed NYSE companies demonstrated a desire and
willingness to issue shares on other than a one share-one vote basis." This
change in corporate capitalization practices was prompted both by some issuers'
desire to create classes of securities that would help them fend off hostile tender
offers and by others to create classes of securities specifically responsive to
business necessities, particularly in structuring corporate combinations. Second,
competition from other market centers that do not bar the listing of companies
having common stock with disproportionate voting rights encouraged the
NYSE's study.60
The American Stock Exchange permits the listing of companies with dual
voting rights. In addition, with the development of real-time reporting of
transactions and quotations in NASDAQ's National Market System securities"'
and the expanded growth in transaction volume of over-the-counter securities,
the over-the-counter market's attractiveness as a primary trading market has
been significantly augmented. Thus, interwoven with the issue of altering the
NYSE's listing standards are intermarket competition and tender-offer defense
57. For example, Delaware provides for one vote for each share "unless otherwise provided in
the certificate of incorporation." Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 212(a) (1984).
58. New York Stock Exchange rule 102.00 regarding listing requirements states that "[the
Exchange is also concerned with such matters as voting rights of shareholders." 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH) 2501. A specific basis for terminating a listing on the Exchange is creating a class of
nonvoting common stock. New York Stock Exchange rule § 802.00. 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2565.
59. By September 1985, a total of 20 companies listed on the NYSE had either issued a class of
common stock with limited voting rights or had announced the intention to issue such stock.
Disparate Voting Requires Study, NASD Decides, Legal Times, Sept. 23, 1985, at 7.
60. See NYSE Panel to Urge Rules Change, Wash. Post, Dec. 29, 1984, at B-I, col. 2
(comments of A.A. Sommer, Jr., cochairman of the NYSE Subcommittee on Shareholder Participa-
tion and Qualitative Listing Standards).
61. For a discussion of transaction reporting of National Market System securities, see infra note
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strategies, as well as federal preemption, state corporate law, and corporate
democracy.
In 1984, the NYSE's Subcommittee on Shareholder Participation and Quali-
tative Listing Standards mailed a questionnaire to more than 3200 listed
companies, member firms, institutional investors, attorneys, academicians, and
state securities administrators. The questionnaire sought input on a number of
questions relating to the possibility of the NYSE modifying its one share-one
vote listing requirement. The Subcommittee received 425 responses, character-
ized as "extremely helpful to the Subcommittee in developing its recommenda-
tions." 2 In January 1985, the Subcommittee presented to the NYSE Public
Policy Committee of the Board of Directors an initial report recommending
certain modifications of the NYSE's listing standards. If adopted by the NYSE
and approved by the Commission, the modifications will not require delisting of
a NYSE-listed company, even if the company adopts charter provisions creating
two classes of common stock with disparate voting rights, provided that: (i) the
creation of the stock with disparate voting rights is approved by two-thirds of all
shares entitled to vote on the proposition; (ii) the issuer's board has a majority of
independent directors at the time the matter is voted upon and a majority of
those independent directors approve the proposal, or if the issuer's board has
less than a majority of independent directors, then all independent directors
approve the proposal; (iii) the voting differential is no more than ten to one; and
(iv) the rights of the two classes of stock are substantially the same except for the
voting power per share.63
The Subcommittee's recommendations have sparked considerable debate.
Some see the proposed change in the Big Board's listing standards as a threat to
corporate democracy. Further, the contemplated amendment is perceived as a
competitively defensive maneuver that will encourage a race to the bottom in the
listing standards of the securities markets. 4 Proponents argue that the NYSE
will not be altering shareholders' voting rights. Rather, those rights can only be
amended by a shareholder vote. Proponents argue that to deny NYSE listing for
companies with dual voting stock would be to deny shareholders who chose to
limit their own voting privileges the opportunity to have their shares traded in
the market provided by the Big Board."5
62, Letter from Fletcher L. Byron, Chairman of the NYSE Public Policy Committee, to David
A. Lipton (Jan. 25, 1985).
63. NYSE Subcommittee on Shareholder Participation and Qualitative Listing Standards,
Initial Report, Dual Class Classification (1985).
64. See Two-Class Common Covid Be Harmful, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1985, § 3, at 2 (comments
of Bevis Longstreth, former SEC Commissioner); Don't Bend the Big Board's Rules, Fortune, Mar.
18, 1985, at 185 (comments of John Whitehead, former cochairman of Goldman Sachs & Co.);
Disparate Voting Requires Study, NASD Decides, Legal Times, Sept. 23, 1985, at 7 (comments of
Michael R. Klein of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering).
65. See Drop the 'One Share, One Vote' Rule, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1985, § 3, at 2 (comments of
A.A. Sommer, Jr., former SEC Commissioner and cochairman of the NYSE Subcommittee on
Shareholder Participation and Qualitative Listing Standards).
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Although the Public Policy Committee of the NYSE had sought further
comment on its Subcommittee's proposals, by the end of November 1985, it had
not yet made a recommendation to the NYSE's board concerning the proposals.
Such a recommendation would be a prerequisite for board action and for a
proposal of an actual rule change. A rule change proposal would, in turn, need
the approval of the Commission before adoption.66 In the interim, the Board of
Governors of the National Association of Securities Dealers has decided to
conduct further studies before deciding its own one share-one vote listing
requirement for companies trading in its NASDAQ National Market System."
Legislation introduced in June 1985 would have required most large companies
to have a single class of common stock with equal voting rights for all sharehold-
ers.6" This legislation is stalled in Congress.
SIDE-BY-SIDE TRADING OF OTC OPTIONS
The most significant Commission market regulatory actions taken in 1985
were a series of related decisions that culminated in the Commission's approval
of side-by-side exchange trading of options in over-the-counter (OTC) securities
along with their underlying securities. 9 This development involved at least four
distinct issues: Should exchanges be granted unlisted trading privileges in OTC
securities? Should trading in options in OTC securities be permitted? Should
multiple trading of OTC options be permitted? And if trading in OTC options
were permitted, should side-by-side trading of such options be permitted both
on and off the exchanges (thus requiring a grant to exchanges of unlisted
trading privileges (UTP) in OTC securities)? In many respects, the issues
confronting the Commission were reactions to its earlier national market system
and option-trading policies, effected within the past decade. Also, in some
respects, the subsidiary issues (most notably, the question of granting UTP in
OTC securities) are more significant than the final question of side-by-side
trading of options in OTC securities.
66. Section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b); rule 19b-4, 17
C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (1985).
67. Disparate Voting Requires Study, NASD Decides, Legal Times, Sept. 23, 1985, at 7.
68. A Bill to Amend the Securities and Exchange Act to Prohibit the Trading on Certain
Exchanges and Markets of Non-voting Shares and Shares Carrying Disproportionate Voting Rights,
S. 1314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess, 131 Cong. Rec. (daily ed. June 18, 1985) (introduced by Senator
D'Amato June 18, 1985).
69. The Commission provisionally made the decision to permit side-by-side exchange trading of
options in over-the-counter securities in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,026, 50 Fed. Reg.
20,310 (1985). Before the decision could be finalized, the Commission had to be willing to grant
unlisted trading privileges to exchanges in OTC securities. The Commission announced it would
grant such privileges in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,412, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1691 (1985) [hereinafter cited as UTP Adoption Release]. The Commission then finalized its
decision to permit side-by-side exchange trading of options in OTC securities. SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 22,439, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,917 (Sept. 20, 1985) [hereinafter
cited as Side-By-Side Trading Approval Release].
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Unlisted Trading Privileges in OTC Securities
A primary goal of the 1975 Securities Act Amendments was to preserve and
encourage competition among securities markets.7" In the 1975 amendments,
Congress directed the Commission to facilitate the development of a national
market system for securities, consistent with certain objectives, including "fair
competition ... between exchange markets and markets other than exchange
markets."71 The legislative history of the 1975 amendments noted the Commis-
sion's historical use of the grant of UTP as a means of promoting competitive
markets for listed securities. It advised that the 1975 amendments in no way
altered the standards or procedures to be followed by the SEC in granting such
privileges.7" The 1975 amendments authorized the Commission to grant UTP
in both listed and OTC securities so long as specified conditions were met. The
terms for granting UTP in listed securities were relatively simple, requiring a
finding that the extension of such privileges would be "consistent with the
maintenance of fair and orderly markets and the protection of investors."73 The
conditions for extending UTP in OTC securities were more complex and
restrictive, requiring, among other matters, an evaluation of "the impact of such
extension on the existing markets for such securities" as well as of "the progress
that had been made toward the development of a national market system."74
After preliminary hesitation, in 1979 the Commission resumed its traditional
liberal posture toward the grant of UTP in listed securities, merely requiring
that before the grant can be made (i) the exchange requesting the trading
privilege must have the capacity to execute trades in a fair and orderly manner
as required by section 6(b) of the 1934 Act, and (ii) transactions in the subject
security must be reported in the consolidated transaction reporting system
(providing last sale information on a real-time basis).7 s As for the grant of UTP
in unlisted securities, the Commission maintained a restrictive policy pending
progress in the national market system.76 Consequently, the benefits afforded
investors through multiple market trading in securities were not as readily
available for OTC securities as for listed securities. The only instances in which
the Commission made exceptions to its policy regarding UTP in OTC securities
involved OTC securities reported in the consolidated transaction reporting
system.77
70. See S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]. This
Senate report accompanied the bill that became the 1975 Securities Reform Act.
71. Section 11A(a)(1)(C)(ii) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78K-1(a)(1)(c)(ii).
72. Senate Report, supra note 70, at 18, 106.
73. Section 12(f)(2) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(f)(2).
74. Id.
75. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 16,422, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,385 (Dec. 12, 1979).
76. The Commission described its restrictive policy in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 21,498,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,712 (Nov. 16, 1984), in which the
Commission solicited public comments on the appropriateness of altering its policy on granting
unlisting trading privileges in OTC securities [hereinafter cited as UTP Comment Release].
77. Id.
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As substantial numbers of OTC securities'became designated National Mar-
ket System (NMS) securities, and thus subject to the reporting requirements of
the consolidated transaction reporting system, 8 the Commission realized that
reviewing its UTP policy toward OTC securities was necessary.79 The in-
creased availability of market information for OTC securities designated as
NMS securities, in conjunction with already existing enhancements to the
NASD's NASDAQ quotation system (such as the dissemination of best bid and
offer information to brokers and the investing public), made trading in NMS
securities "more compatible with exchange trading.""0 In addition, the Commis-
sion believed order processing and execution in OTC securities were more
efficient as a result of the NASD's computer assisted execution system (CAES)
and small order execution system (SOES). s1
Finally, the absence of any "significant adverse effects" on the trading
markets as a result of the link between the exchange markets' intermarket
trading system (ITS) and the NASD's own automatic execution system, CAES,
indicated to the Commission that there were opportunities for competition in
concurrent exchange and OTC trading of certain securities.8 2
The proposal to grant UTP to OTC securities was supported by the majority
of the regional stock exchanges, among others, and was opposed by the NYSE
and the NASD, among others. The proposal's supporters saw it as a means of
advancing a goal of the national market system, "fostering exchange and OTC
market competition." 83 The NYSE, which does not offer trading in unlisted
securities, argued for disapproval of any application for a grant of UTP in OTC
securities in order to maintain the separate and distinctive features of exchange
and OTC markets.8 4 The NASD opposed the proposal because it believed that
the exchange trading structure would favor an order flow to the exchange floor,
regardless of a superior quotation in the OTC market. Thus, in the eyes of the
78. Rule llAa2-1, 17 C.F.R. §240.11Aa2-1 (1985) [hereinafter cited as National Market
System Securities Designation Rule], automatically designated specified categories of actively traded
OTC securities as National Market System securities and thus subject to transaction reporting on a
current basis, pursuant to rule IlAa3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Aa3-1 (1985). Rule 1lAa2-1 also
permits specified categories of issuers of less actively traded OTC securities (tier 2 securities) to elect
to have their securities designated as National Market System securities. In December 1984, the
SEC amended rule llAa2-1 to permit a substantially increased number of OTC issuers of tier 2
securities to elect to have their securities designated as National Market System securities. SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 21,583, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,721 (Dec. 18, 1984). By the time the Commission approved UTP for OTC securities, more
than 2000 OTC securities had been designated as National Market System securities. UTP
Adoption Release, supra note 69.
79. See UTP Comment Release, supra note 76.
80. UTP Adoption Release, supra note 69, at 1692.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. This is an SEC paraphrase of the Midwest'Stock Exchange's position. Id. at 1694.
84. The NYSE might well have been concerned, that to grant exchanges trading privileges in
OTC securities would invite a reexamination by the Commission of exchange prohibitions on off-
board trading in listed securities by exchange members. The Commission hinted at a further
examination of this issue in its UTP Adoption Release, id. at 1699.
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NASD, OTC market makers would not be able to compete on an even basis for
order flow in OTC securities for which UTP had been granted.85
In September 1985,86 the Commission announced its decision to extend UTP
to applicant exchanges in OTC securities, subject to certain conditions. The
privileges would be granted to applicant exchanges only in NMS-designated
OTC securities, and only up to twenty-five such securities could be chosen per
exchange. The grant of UTP to any exchange is contingent upon the Commis-
sion's approving an information reporting plan to be agreed upon by the NASD
and the applicant exchanges and to be submitted by December 1, 1985. The
plan should provide through NASD facilities for the consolidation of OTC and
exchange quotations and transaction reports in OTC securities subject to UTP.
This consolidation of information was seen as necessary to foster competition,
reduce the possibility of fragmenting markets, and facilitate surveillance of the
concurrent trading of the OTC securities both on and off the exchanges. A
further condition requires that exchange off-board trading restrictions not apply
to OTC securities for which UTP is granted. The satisfaction of this condition
is already guaranteed by rule 19c-3, 7 which provides that off-board trading
restrictions may not be applied to securities that either become listed upon an
exchange or subject to unlisted trading upon an exchange subsequent to April
26, 1979. As a final condition, the Commission required that exchange and
NASDAQ market makers provide to one another comparable telephone access
to their respective market centers. This last condition was intended to provide
the intermarket communication necessary to ensure competition between OTC
and exchange market makers. The Commission also encouraged the NASD and
the exchanges to initiate intermarket trading links and rules that would ensure
transactions be executed at the best available price.
As of the end of 1985, no UTPs in OTC securities have been granted nor has
the plan for reporting consolidated quotation and transaction information been
submitted to the Commission. Even when such trading does begin, a number of
knotty problems will remain, such as developing an efficient link between the
exchange and the OTC markets as well as establishing the best price-execution
rules. The Commission's decision, however, carries the potential for establishing
a truly national market for those OTC securities to which unlisted trading
privileges have been granted. This market would provide increased opportuni-
ties for competition, not merely within the exchange or among market makers,
but between exchanges and market makers. It would increase the instances in
which a trading environment having simultaneously the advantages of both
auction and dealer markets would be available in the same securities. Thus, the
grant of UTP in OTC securities represents a significant advance in the goals of
the 1975 Securities Acts Amendments.
85. Id. at 1694.
86. Id. at 1691.
87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-3 (1985).
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Amendments to the NMS Designation Rule
Contemporaneously with its decision to grant UTP in OTC securities, the
Commission also adopted amendmentsa" to its National Market System designa-
tion rule, rule 11 Aa2-1, 9 allowing OTC securities to retain their designation as
NMS securities in certain situations, even if trading in such securities com-
menced on an exchange. Prior to the amendments, the commencement of
exchange trading in NMS securities, whether listed or unlisted, meant the loss
of their NMS status. A number of the regional exchanges argued that the
exclusionary impact of the National Market System designation rule discour-
aged NMS securities from listing on regional exchanges. Permitting unlisted
exchange trading in certain NMS securities would create the same problem for
NASDAQ, since the grant of UTP would terminate a security's NMS status.
The amendments to the National Market System designation rule permit an
NMS security to retain its designation, even when exchange trading commences
in the security, so long as either (i) the security is exchange-listed but not
reported on the consolidated transaction reporting system (such reporting could
lead to the confusion of double reporting on both the NASDAQ system and the
consolidated reporting system), or (ii) the security is traded on an exchange
because of a grant of UTP in that security. The amendments are intended to
encourage intermarket competition by encouraging multiple trading of the same
security on both OTC and exchange markets.
Approval of OTC Options
The Commission's motivations to resolve the question of granting UTP in
OTC securities were in part its approval, in spring 1985, of the trading of
options in securities traded exclusively over the counter and its approval in
concept of integrated market making of OTC options side by side with their
underlying securities."0 Once the Commission acted, there was concern that to
continue to deny unlisted trading in OTC securities would place exchange
options market makers at a disadvantage to their OTC counterparts. Without
Commission approval of UTP in OTC options, exchange markets would not be
able to provide executions for the stock side of trading strategies employing both
stock and option transactions. In the OTC market, however, transactions could
be effected both in options as well as in the securities underlying the options. In
addition, integrated OTC market makers would be at a competitive advantage
over exchanges because they would have immediate access to order-flow infor-
mation in both OTC stock and options and would be able to adjust their prices
accordingly. Thus, the Commission's approval of trading in OTC options and
88. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,413, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,914 (Sept.
16, 1983).
89. See National Market System Securities Designation Rule, supra note 78.
90. The Commission announced its decision to permit trading in options in OTC securities in
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,026, 50 Fed. Reg. 20,310 (1985) [hereinafter cited as OTC
Options Release].
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its approval in concept of side-by-side trading of OTC options with their
underlying securities necessitated Commission consideration of granting UTP
in OTC securities.
Proposals to trade listed OTC options had been before the Commission prior
to the more recent requests upon which the Commission acted. In the mid-
1970s, various exchanges made several proposals to trade standardized options
on securities traded exclusively over the counter.91 These proposals were volun-
tarily withdrawn to accommodate the Commission, which requested a morato-
rium on the introduction of new option products during the period in which the
Commission staff studied the options markets. The report9" of that study stated
that "[tihe absence of a real-time last sale reporting of transactions in underly-
ing securities traded exclusively in the over-the-counter market may present
questions of fairness if options trading with respect to these securities is
permitted."9 The authors of the report were concerned that the absence of real-
time reporting for underlying securities would make it difficult to determine the
value of an option at a specific time. The report advised that a "prudent course"
would be to defer initiating trading in options in OTC securities until the
underlying securities were included in the consolidated transaction reporting
system.
9 4
Starting in 1982, real-time last sale transaction reports became available for
those OTC securities designated as NMS securities pursuant to rule 11 Aa3-1.99
Between June 1980 and November 1984, six exchanges and the NASD submit-
ted rule-change proposals to the Commission to initiate trading in listed options
in OTC securities. In May 1985, the Commission announced that it found
trading in options on securities traded exclusively over the counter consistent
with the 1934 Act.16 Implementation of such trading was to be delayed for up to
sixty days, during which time the exchanges and the NASD were to work out
adequate surveillance plans for the options trading.
Multiple Trading of OTC Options
At the same time that the Commission approved the trading of options on
OTC securities, it also approved multiple trading of such options and approved
in principle side-by-side trading of OTC options with their underlying securi-
ties.97 Multiple trading of options means the trading of the same option in more
than one marketplace. The historical concern with multiple trading of a security
was that it would lead to market fragmentation: the same security would be
traded at different prices at the same time depending upon in which market the
91. For a listing of these proposals, see OTC Options Release, id.
92. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Report of the Special Study of
the Options Market (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as Options Study Report].
93. Id. at 933.
94. Id. at 975.
95. See supra note 78.
96. OTC Options Release, supra note 90.
97. Id.
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trade occurred. Concern over market fragmentation had deterred the Commis-
sion from permitting multiple trading of options on listed securities. As for
multiple trading of OTC options, however, the Commission adopted a position
that relied more upon market forces, arguing that the benefits derived from
multiple trading, notably reduced spreads and increased services, would out-
weigh the problems resulting from fragmentation.9" Further, the Commission
reasoned that, unlike the situation in regard to options on unlisted stock,
permitting multiple trading in options on OTC securities would not disrupt
already existing market structures because no market was yet trading OTC
options. Finally, the Commission responded to the argument that the benefits of
multiple trading would be short-lived because historically a dominant market
has always emerged in multiple trading. The Commission noted that the
continued existence of an alternate market "would help encourage the dominant
market to continue to provide improved services and facilities and to respond to
the needs of market participants or risk losing its market share."9
Integrated Trading of OTC Options
Integration, or side-by-side trading of OTC options with their underlying
securities, allows the same market maker, whether over the counter or on an
exchange, to trade a specific OTC option and the underlying security at the
same time. As in its approach to multiple trading, the Commission had re-
frained from permitting integrated trading of listed options in exchange-traded
securities. Concerns about integrated trading, identified in the Options Study
Report,' included informational advantages that would inure to the integrated
market makers, as well as increased opportunities for manipulation. An inte-
grated market maker would be in a position to trade options on the basis of
nonpublicly available information concerning trading activity in the underlying
security.' Similarly, an integrated market maker would have opportunities to
manipulate by effecting small price movements in underlying securities. This in
turn could cause substantial profits in options positions.102 Against these con-
cerns the Commission balanced the potential advantages of integrated market
making as well as the enticement of more capital into market making, which
would produce greater liquidity and depth in the respective stock and options
market.
The Commission determined that, for OTC options, the advantages of
integrated market making outweighed the drawbacks. Regarding the informa-
tional advantages to market makers of side-by-side trading, the Commission
reasoned that last sale reporting of OTC securities is "presently adequate
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Options Study Report, supra note 92, at 876-77.
101. Id. at 880-85.
102. Id. at 885-92.
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generally to support an options market on NMS stocks as well as to allow
integrated market making. '
Furthermore, for the most active NMS securities with numerous competitive
market makers, each with substantial trading volume, the Commission argued
that no single market maker could have a significant informational advantage.
Similarly, in regard to potential manipulation, the Commission asserted that,
given the deep and liquid markets of the most active NMS securities, it was very
improbable that a single market maker could effect a manipulative scheme since
manipulation typically requires some degree of market control. In addition, in
the highly competitive markets of the most active NMS securities, for which
quotation spreads are generally quite narrow, manipulative trading would
result in abnormal transaction reports and be detectable, so long as equity and
options audit trails were put in place prior to any integrated market making.
Based upon this reasoning, in the spring of 1985 the Commission approved
the concept of side-by-side trading in the six most active NMS securities"" but
indicated its belief that such trading opportunities would have to be made
available to exchanges as well as to the OTC market. Such integrated OTC
options trading on the exchanges was to await a Commission decision to grant
UTP in OTC securities. In addition, the Commission indicated that it would
not permit integrated trading to begin until adequate equity and options audit
trails in the six most active NMS securities were operational. The Commission
sought comment on its proposal to initiate a trial program in integrated trading.
Specifically, it sought comment on the inclusion of the exchanges in this
program (which inclusion the Commission viewed as a corequisite for inte-
grated trading over the counter) as well as the grant of UTP in OTC securities
to the exchanges. Final approval of the pilot program in side-by-side trading
came in September 1985,115 immediately following the Commission approval of
UTP in OTC securities. The Commission opined that side-by-side trading
could commence in January 1986, provided that appropriate audit trail and
surveillance enhancements were in place by that time. By the late fall of 1985, it
appears that the January 1986 projected start-up time of the trial program
would prove to be optimistic."'
Significance of Regulatory Actions
It is significant to note that for each of these major national market system
issues-the grant of UTP in OTC securities, expansion of the number of NMS
securities, trading options in OTC securities, multiple trading of OTC options,
and integrated trading of OTC options-the Commission was willing to assume
103. OTC Options Release, supra note 90.
104. Id.
105. Side-By-Side Trading Approval Release, supra note 69.
106. As early as mid-October 1985, the NASD had indicated that the audit trail and surveil-
lance enhancements necessary for the commencement of side-by-side trading would not be in place
prior to March or April 1986. NASD Eyes March or April for Side-By-Side Pilot; Amex, PHLX to
Join, Sec. Week, Oct. 14, 1985, at 5-6.
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in 1985 a far more permissive posture than it had been as recently as five years
earlier. It has yet to assume such a posture in regard to listed options in
exchange-listed securities. For some issues, this change in the Commission
outlook can be explained by the subject matter itself-OTC options as opposed
to options in exchange-listed securities. The altered outlook can also be attrib-
uted to the introduction of last sale reporting on a real-time basis to OTC
securities. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, this new outlook might also
be explained by the Commission's apparently increased willingness to rely on
market forces in evaluating the correctness of certain trading modifications.07
Perhaps in recognition of the potential impact of the Commission's issues for
resolution in 1985 on the structure of the national market system and its
underlying policy, the Commission, in mid-1985, solicited public comment on
the direction of the national market system.' °8 The questions the Commission
raised in this release focused on the integration of NMS securities into national
market system facilities. However, the Commission also engaged a number of
the remaining unresolved issues relating to the national market system's evolu-
tion-notably, methods of effectively linking trading markets and of insuring
the best execution of orders within the national market system. These two
thorny matters, always perceived as central to establishing a national market
system, will undoubtedly be under consideration by the Commission in the
coming years.
TERMINATING THE INTERTWINING DOCTRINE:
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC. V. BYRD
In March 1985, in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,109 the Supreme Court
put to rest the "intertwining" doctrine for customer-broker controversies in the
securities industry. Although not directly related to either Commission activity
or the national market system, this decision may have a significant impact on
self-regulatory organizations. Under the intertwining doctrine, customers were
able to litigate, in federal court, claims against their brokers so long as any
portion of the customer's claims was based upon the federal securities acts. This
was true even when they had contracted to bring such claims to arbitration.
When a customer opens an account to execute transactions with a particular
broker, they generally agree to arbitrate any controversy between them relating
to or arising out of the broker's promised services. The exchanges and the
107. Neither UTP in OTC options nor side-by-side trading in OTC options might ultimately
receive an entirely enthusiastic reception from the exchange markets. Industry sources indicated in
October 1985 that NYSE participation in the programs was unlikely. In addition, a number of
exchanges that had expressed an intent to participate were viewed as having merely reserved rights
to participate rather than that they would certainly participate. See id.
108. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,127, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,786 (June 21, 1985). The original deadline for comments was later extended from
September 30 to December 30, 1985. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,507, [Current] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 83,926 (Oct. 4, 1985).
109. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
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NASD each provides arbitration panels to settlethese customer-broker contro-
versies. When controversies do arise, customers frequently prefer to litigate
rather than arbitrate because of the perceived advantages of avoiding an indus-
try panel, using discovery rules provided in federal litigation, and obtaining in
litigation awards for attorneys' fees or punitive damages. (Such awards are
typically unavailable in arbitration.) In 1953, in Wilko v. Swan,"' the Supreme
Court held that the customer protections provided by the 1933 Securities Act,
including the ability to seek judicial enforcement of these protections, cannot be
overridden by predispute contracts that commit customers to arbitration. The
reasoning in Wilko was later applied to disputes arising under the Exchange
Act."'
Customer claims against brokers frequently include causes of action based
upon state law as well as causes of action based upon the federal securities laws.
When these mixed claims were brought to litigation, several circuits permitted
the state claims the same advantages that Wilko provided to the federal securi-
ties acts claims, and thus to be litigated." 2 This practice came to be known as
"intertwining." After Byrd, customer-broker disputes involving state claims as
well as federal securities acts claims are to be bifurcated, with the state claim
portion being sent to arbitration. The number of cases each year that will be
affected by the Byrd decision is still unclear. It is clear, however, that this
decision has already increased the number of matters to be resolved by industry
arbitration panels, which had already been experiencing a dramatic growth in
caseloads even prior to the decision." 3
In addition, a concurring opinion in Byrd by Justice White raised speculation
that the Wilko rule would no longer be mechanically applied to issues arising
under the Exchange Act." 4 Since most customer-broker disputes arise under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, Justice White's reservations on the applicability
of Wilko suggest the possibility of an even further expanded arbitration caseload
for the self-regulatory organizations. Indeed, most courts that have dealt with
the Wilko doctrine since Byrd have not permitted Exchange Act litigants to
avoid arbitration."' This increase in matters going to arbitration will require
110. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
111. See, e.g., Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th
Cir. 1977); Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
112. See, e.g., Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir.
1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); C. F. Dickinson v. Heinnold
Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
113. Between 1979 and 1984, the number of new customer cases annually brought to arbitration
went up 322%. Morgenstern, The Leaky Umbrella that Is the SEC, Money, Nov. 1985, at 228.
114. Justice White noted several distinctions between the claim brought in Wilko under the
1933 Act and claims brought under the 1934 Act. Most notably, the Wilko claim was based upon an
express remedy provided by § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o(2) (1982). Cases brought
under the 1934 Act, and specifically § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), rely upon implied remedies.
115. Since Byrd, "[tihe majority of federal district courts, including the lower Byrd court on
remand, have interpreted the [Supreme] Court to disapprove of their prior refusal to compel
arbitration and have now begun to compel the arbitration of 1934 Act claims." Peele v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 620 F. Supp. 61 (D.C. Mo. 1985).
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the self-regulatory organizations either to increase the resources they devote to
arbitration or to devise alternative methods for resolving disputes.
GOVERNMENT SECURITIES REGULATION
The failures of firms that traded government securities (including Bevill
Bresler & Shulman Asset Management Corp., ESM Government Securities,
Inc., Drysdale Securities, Lombard-Wall, RTD Securities, and Lion Capital
Group), as well as the extraordinary losses incurred by Marsh & McLennan in
government-bond trading, have raised questions about regulating the markets
for these securities. Unless such firms are engaged in other securities transac-
tions, their operations are not presently regulated by any federal (or state)
authority, except insofar as they are subject to the general antifraud regulations
of the federal securities laws. As a result of these concerns, both houses of
Congress, the SEC, and the Treasury Department have all sought comments on
the problems or proposed legislation aimed at curing perceived regulatory
deficiencies.
In a recent release, the SEC requested comments on oversight of the U.S.
.government and agency securities markets and dealers.116 Currently, neither the
SEC nor the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) has specific statutory authority over
firms that deal exclusively in government securities. Two of the key issues on
which the SEC sought comment were the possibility of direct federal regulation
of this area and the creation of a self-regulatory organization under supervision
of the SEC, the FRB, the Treasury, or a combination of the three.
The House of Representatives recently approved a bill creating a self-
regulatory organization for government securities dealers.117 This bill would
create a government securities rulemaking board, overseen by the FRB, by
adding section 15C to the Exchange Act. The rulemaking board would be made
up of nine members appointed for two years by the FRB. The board would
adopt rules on investor protection; trading practices; use of customer securities,
deposits, or credit balances; and the transfer and control of government securi-
ties in repurchase agreements and similar transactions. It would also promul-
gate rules on interpretations, recordkeeping, capital requirements, and other
financial responsibility standards.
If the FRB determines that the rulemaking board's rules are inadequate to
meet the purpose of the legislation, it would have its own authority under the
statute to enact its own requirements for the purchase, sale, or carrying of
government securities and for "when issued" trading. The SEC would have
authority to enforce rules enacted by the rulemaking board or the FRB. It
would also be empowered to censure, suspend, terminate, or revoke the registra-
tion of a government securities broker-dealer.
116. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 21,959, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,760 (Apr. 19, 1985).
117. Government Securities Act of 1985, H.R. 2032, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), 131 Cong.
Rec. H1971 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1985).
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Under the bill, government securities dealers would have to register with the
SEC. The FRB would have authority to exempt any government securities
broker-dealer or any class of broker-dealer (bank) from the registration require-
ments. It is not known at this time what the Senate's position on this bill will be;
a somewhat different bill was introduced in the Senate by the chairman of the
Banking Security Subcommittee. The Senate's bill would enable the FRB to
regulate directly government securities dealers.
Finally, the Treasury Department is also drafting a bill to give it rulemaking
authority over government securities dealers. This bill has not been formally
presented to date and of the three appears the least likely to receive favorable
treatment.
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
The following significant market regulatory developments should be men-
tioned. They have not been listed in any order of importance, and the final
resolution of some of these developments has not yet occurred.
First, on January 8, 1986, the Federal Reserve Board adopted b , a 3-2 vote
an interpretation of its margin regulations that would restrict the use of junk
bonds in takeover attempts."' Under the interpretation, margin requirements
will be imposed on debt securities issued by a corporation with no assets of its
own when the securities are used to finance the acquisition of margin stock of a
target company. The FRB considers debt securities issued to finance such an
acquisition indirectly secured by the stock of the target company and, therefore,
subject to the margin rules under FRB regulation G. Such debt securities are
typically high-yield securities below investment grade, which have been charac-
terized as junk bonds. The revised margin rules will not be applied to a
financing by an acquiring corporation if it has substantial assets or cash flow to
finance the acquisition, that is, it really is not a shell corporation; if the parent of
a shell corporation guarantees the debt securities; if there is a merger agreement
between the acquiring corporation and the target, or state law permits a merger
without shareholder approval; or if the debt securities are being offered to the
public. If none of these conditions is met, shell corporations apparently will no
longer be able to finance more than fifty percent of the cost of takeovers with
junk bonds and will have to find additional sources of cash. The Reagan
administration and investment bankers, which had actively developed financing
with such securities, strongly opposed the measure.
Second, the SEC solicited public comment on issues concerning the increasing
internationalization of the world's securities markets." 9 Both the American
Stock Exchange and the Boston Stock Exchange established electronic linkages
with the Toronto Stock Exchange to allow orders in dually traded securities to
be routed between the Toronto exchange and the two domestic exchanges. The
118. Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1986, at 2, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1986, at D-1, col. 3.
119. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6568, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,743 (Feb. 28, 1985).
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NYSE set its opening time one half hour earlier so that its trading hours would
be closer to those of the European trading markets.
Third, a joint study by the SEC, the CFTC, and the Federal Reserve Board,
released in January 1985, concluded that new financial futures and options
markets serve a useful economic purpose and that no additional legislation is
now needed to create an appropriate regulatory framework. 120
Fourth, the SEC approved an amendment to rule 10b-10, which will require
dealers, after March 17, 1986, to disclose to customers their markups on trades
involving NMS securities.
1 21
Finally, a number of exchanges have begun to permit diversified brokerage
firms to operate specialist units on their floors. The move is designed to increase
the capital available for specialist units.
ACCOUNTING REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK REPURCHASES AND
BUSINESS COMBINATIONS: FASB TECHNICAL
BULLETINS
On December 31, 1985, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
adopted FASB technical bulletin no. 85-6, Accounting for a Purchase of Trea-
sury Shares at a Price Significantly in Excess of the Current Market Price of the
Shares and the Income Statement Classification of Costs Incurred in Defending
Against a Takeover Attempt. The amounts paid by a company for the purchase
of treasury shares at a price significantly in excess of the current market price of
the shares, a practice better known as greenmail, should be accounted for by the
company according to the substance of the transaction. The excess price creates
a presumption that the purchase price includes amounts attributable to items
other than the shares purchased. The allocation and treatment of such amount
should be disclosed. If no stated or unstated consideration in addition to the
capital stock can be identified, the entire purchase price should be accounted for
as the cost of treasury shares.
Prior to the new statement, the total amount a company paid for its own
shares reduced the equity it reported on its balance sheet, and the company was
not required to report any amount in its income statement. The FASB's
statem nt requires companies that buy their own shares at a premium to record
part otthe cost as an expense. Consequently, the statement may make resisting
an unwanted takeover more difficult, as well as reduce the number of share
reacquisitions entered into for the purpose of bolstering earnings per share.
120. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, A Study of the Effects on the Economy of
Trading in Futures and Options, (December 1984).
121. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,297, [Current] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,912
(Sept. 11, 1985).
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On the same date, the FASB also adopted FASB technical bulletin no. 85-5,
which addresses five issues related to accounting for business combinations. This
statement provides the following: (i) The costs incurred to close duplicate
facilities of an acquiring company should be charged to expense in determining
net income. (ii) The legal structure of a specific transaction determines how a
parent company should account for a minority interest when a subsidiary, in
exchange for all its stock, acquires the stock of another subsidiary of the same
parent. When minority shares are party to the exchange of shares, the transac-
tion should be accounted for by the purchase method, but when minority
shareholders are not party to the exchange, the exchange of shares should be
accounted for at historical cost. (iii) An exchange by a partially owned subsidi-
ary of its common stock for the outstanding voting common stock of its parent (a
downstream merger) cannot be accounted for like a pooling of interests. (iv) The
issuance in a business combination of common shares identical to other out-
standing common shares, except that the issuer retains a right of first refusal to
repurchase the shares issued in certain circumstances, precludes the issuer from
accounting for the business combination as a pooling of interests. (v) Converting
a mutual or cooperative enterprise of stock ownership within two years before a
plan of combination is initiated or between the dates a combination is initiated
and consummated does not preclude accounting for the combination as a pooling
of interests.
Except for the first provision of FASB statement 85-5, which becomes
effective for transactions consummated after June 5, 1985, both technical
bulletins are effective for transactions consummated after December 31, 1985.
PENSION ACCOUNTING: FASB STATEMENT
In December 1985, the FASB issued a statement entitled Employers' Ac-
counting For Pensions. The major issue of legal significance raised by this
action relates to part of the implementation provisions. Paragraphs 36-38 deal
with recognition of liabilities and assets. Paragraph 76 provides that paragraphs
36-38 shall be effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1988.
These provisions could require recognition of liabilities in situations in which
current generally accepted accounting principles do not require recognition.
Thus, the implementation provision could prove a serious hardship on any
company subject to preexisting financial reporting covenants in indentures or
other contracts, such as debt restrictions, debt-to-capital ratios, and minimum
equity requirements, that run beyond December 15, 1988.22 Consequently, the
proposed accounting rules could cause companies to go into default.12
122. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87 (Dec. 1985).
123. Comment Letter from ABA Committee on Law and Accounting to Financial Accounting
Standards Board (June 28, 1985).
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CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS:
PROPOSED S-X AMENDMENTS
On April 23, 1985, the SEC proposed amendments to rule 3A-02 of regula-
tion S-X under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. These would clarify
the considerations involved in a corporation's decision whether to use consoli-
dated statements. Rule 3A-02 currently provides, in part, that "[t]he registrant
shall follow in the consolidated financial statement principles of inclusion or
exclusion which will clearly exhibit the financial position and results of opera-
tions of the registrant and its subsidiaries: Provided, however, that the registrant
shall not consolidate: (1) Any subsidiary, which is not majority owned ....
Many companies have cited this rule as prohibiting consolidation of a controlled
entity unless there is majority ownership.
The rule was written at a time when the Commission was attempting to
correct abuses by registrants who would consolidate an entity they did not in
substance control.' 25 The Commission has stated the necessity to clarify that rule
3A-02 "is subject to the overriding consideration of accounting for the substance
of the particular relationship.' 1 26 Thus, the revised rule would provide that
registrants generally should consolidate majority-owned subsidiaries and gener-
ally should not consolidate entities not majority owned. "The determination of
majority ownership requires a careful analysis of the facts and circumstances of a
particular relationship among entities."'27 The proposed rule seeks to adopt a
substance-over-form approach to consolidated statements.
2 s
124. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3A-02 (1985).
125. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6577, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,763 (Apr. 23, 1985).
126. Id.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. The SEC already has suggested this approach in litigation. In In re Coopers & Lybrand
and M. Bruce Cohen, CPA, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 21,520, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
73,445 (Nov. 27, 1984), the SEC ruled that Digilog, Inc. should have consolidated its statements
with Digilog Business Systems, Inc., a corporation in which Digilog, Inc. did not own a majority
interest but in which Digilog owned convertible notes pursuant to which it had the right to obtain
90% of Digilog Business Systems' outstanding stock. Although the SEC accepted a consent and
settlement in the litigation, it remarked:
There do however, arise situations in which control, apart from actual majority ownership,
strongly suggests the need for consolidation in order to accurately depict the economic realities
of the relationship between two entities. In deciding on consolidation policy "the aim should be
to make the financial presentation which is most meaningful in the circumstances." APB No.
51 3. Substance must govern form in the application of accounting principles. APB State-
ment No. 4. In view of these overriding aims, consolidation may be required in the absence of
majority ownership in form where one entity in substance achieves the same effect as majority
ownership through control by contract or otherwise.
See, e.g., In re Laventhal & Horwath, SEC Securities Act Release No. 13,976, [1937-1982
Accounting Series Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,249 (Sept. 21, 1977); In re
Atlantic Corp., [1961-1964 Decisions] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,949 (Dec. 6, 1963).
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OPINION SHOPPING
In the past year, the practice of seeking out or changing to accountants who
would be willing to interpret generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
in a favorable manner, often referred to as "opinion shopping," has begun to
receive attention from the SEC. Many members of the accounting community
object to this term and believe that the SEC's proposals attempt to regulate
practices that are not at all objectionable.'
In In re Broadview Financial Corp., ° the SEC claimed that Broadview filed
a Form 10-Q with materially overstated financial statements and that certain
accounting practices of Broadview violated GAAP. The SEC also used the
litigation, however, as an opportunity to express its negative view of opinion
shopping:
Auditors who condone or assist in an issuer's efforts to circumvent GAAP
may themselves violate the federal securities laws.
The independent auditor has the responsibility to maintain a standard of
professionalism which assures the public that he will maintain his indepen-
dence and objectively review the financial statements of his client. Acquies-
cence to "opinion shopping" taints the professionalism of the auditor and
more importantly, erodes the public confidence in the audit function
itself.'2 '
Since Broadview, the SEC has attempted to regulate opinion shopping
through two releases dated July 1, 1985.32 In Securities Act Release No. 6592,
the Commission proposes to amend item 304 of regulation S-K,' 33 item 9(c) of
schedule 14A,'34 and Form S-18'"I to require disclosure of changes in accoun-
tants and of disagreements with former accountants that may have arisen prior
to the registrant's becoming subject to the Exchange Act's filing requirements.
Currently, this kind of information must be disclosed only when a Form 8-K
obligation exists at the time of change. In Securities Act Release No. 6594, the
SEC requested comments on possible alternative ways to gain disclosure of
opinion shopping by registrants subject to SEC filing requirements. The SEC
suggests three possible triggering events: change of accountants, change of
accounting principles, and consultation with a second accountant.
On December 6, 1985, the Auditing Standards Board of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued an exposure draft on
129. Comment Letter from ABA to SEC (Oct. 8, 1985); Comment Letter from American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants to SEC (Oct. 17, 1985).
130. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 21,949, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,454 (Apr. 17,
1985).
131. Id.
132. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6594, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) [ 83,804 (July 1, 1985); SEC Securities Act Release No. 6592 [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,901 (July 1, 1985).
133. 17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (1985).
134. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1985).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 239.28 (1985).
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reports on the application of accounting principles. The draft proposes perfor-
mance and reporting standards when additional accountants, other than contin-
uing accountants, are consulted on the application of accounting principles to
specific transactions and certain hypothetical transactions.
LIFO FOR INVENTORIES
In a staff accounting bulletin issued March 19, 1985,136 the Staff stated that
registrants and their independent accountants should look to an AICPA issues
paper, Identification and Discussion of Certain Financial Accounting and Re-
porting Issues Concerning LIFO Inventories,3 ' "for guidance in determining
what constitutes acceptable LIFO accounting practice." The staff took this
action because there was an "absence of existing authoritative literature on
LIFO accounting." A 1981 amendment to the IRS regulations, providing that
companies could apply different last in, first out (LIFO) standards for tax
purposes than for financial inventory purposes, partially caused the gap in the
literature.
The Staff considered the paper "to be an accumulation of existing acceptable
LIFO accountirig practices which does not establish any new standards and does
not diverge from generally accepted accounting principles." The Staff also
stated that when a registrant and the independent accountant decide that their
own LIFO practices are preferable under the circumstances, they "should be
prepared to justify their position in the event that a question is raised by the
staff." Finally, "the staff does not expect to routinely raise questions about
changes in LIFO practices" made in conformity with the AICPA paper.
INDUCED CONVERSION OF CONVERTIBLE DEBT
On March 29, 1985, the FASB issued statement no. 84, Induced Conversions
of Convertible Debt. The statement amends APB opinion no. 26, Early Extin-
guishment of Debt, to provide that the opinion does not apply to situations
covered by statement no. 84.
The statement provides the accounting method required for conversions of
convertible debt to equity securities when the debtor induces conversions of the
debt by offering additional securities or other consideration to convertible
debtholders. It applies to such inducements offered after March 31, 1985. The
statement requires the debtor enterprise to "recognize an expense equal to the
fair value of all securities and other consideration transferred in the transaction
in excess of the fair value of securities issuable pursuant to the original
conversion terms" and does not permit the debtor to report the expense as an
extraordinary item. Fair value of the securities must be "measured as of the date
the inducement offer is accepted by the convertible debt holder."
136. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 58, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,058, 74,141 (1985).
137. Task Force on LIFO Inventory Problems, American Institute of Certified Public Accoun-
tants, Identification and Discussion of Certain Financial Accounting and Reporting Issues Concern-
ing LIFO Inventories (1984).
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The statement was adopted despite the dissent of Robert T. Sprouse, who
considered it inadequate for failing to distinguish between two different fact
situations: "(a) debt convertible into equity securities whose market values are
greater than the conversion price ... and (b) debt convertible into equity
securities whose market values are less than the conversion price."
REAL ESTATE LEASES AND SALE-LEASEBACK
TRANSACTIONS
On May 29, 1985, the FASB reversed its May 22, 1985, decision to issue a
technical bulletin saying that leveraged leasing treatment for real estate leases
and sale-leaseback transactions is not permitted by a literal reading of statement
no. 13, Accounting for Leases. The action allows current accounting practices to
continue.
PROPOSED PROXY RULES REQUIRING
DISCLOSURES AFFECTING ACCOUNTANTS
On July 1, 1985, the SEC proposed rules updating and simplifying proxy
requirements.13 Proposed item 9 to schedule 14A would require registrants in a
proxy solicitation relating to an annual or a special meeting for the selection of
directors (or a solicitation of consents for the same purpose), or a solicitation for
the election, approval, or ratification of the registrant's independent public
accountant, to disclose whether the registrant's principal accountant,
participate[s] in a professional organization which has both a peer review
program and an independent oversight function, both of which are subject
to review by the Commission ... [and] ... if a member of such an
organization [a statement whether or not the principal accountant] has
undergone a peer review, and if so the date of the review report. 39
The second revision concerning independent public accountants relates to
changes of accountants and any disagreements accompanying or preceding such
changes. Under the proposed item 9, a registrant would be required to disclose
whether a disagreement with the prior accountant over accounting principles
has occurred in connection with a change of accountants. The proposal would
be applicable only if the change in accountants occurred before the registrant
became subject to the Exchange Act's requirements. The proposal would not
change the existing requirements for registrants who were required to make
periodic reports under the Exchange Act at the time the change in accountants
occurred. The proposal would revise item 9, item 304 of regulation S-K, and
138. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6592, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 22,195, [Current]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,901 (July 1, 1985).
139. Id. The proposed release also attempts to regulate opinion shopping. See supra section
entitled "Opinion Shopping." The release would also apply the principles of the integrated
disclosure system to proxy statement disclosure and would modify and add certain disclosure
requirements.
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Form S-18, however, so that disclosure would be required in annual reports to
securityholders, proxy statements, registration statements, and periodic reports
about changes in accountants that have not previously been reported.
MANAGEMENT MUST PROVE SECURITIES'
REALIZABLE VALUE EQUALS CARRYING VALUE
In release no. SAB-59, issued September 5, 1985, the Staff clarified the
circumstances under which the cost basis of an individual security must be
written down to a new cost basis and the amount of the write-down accounted
for as a realized loss. Paragraph 21 of FASB statement no. 12 provides that a
write-down and loss realization must occur when market value declines below
cost as of the balance sheet date of an individual security, if such decline is
"other than temporary."
The staff bulletin states, "the staff believes the FASB consciously chose the
phrase 'other than temporary' because it did not intend that the test be
'permanent impairment.' " Consequently, management cannot argue that be-
cause it is unable to determine whether its investment is permanently impaired,
no realized loss must be recognized even though current market price is below
the corporation's average acquisition price. Management must have evidence to
show that noncurrent marketable equity securities still have a realizable value.
Once management determines that a write-down, recognizable as a loss, is
necessary, the actual amount of the loss to be recognized should be determined
case by case according to the facts and circumstances.
DISCLOSURE OF INVESTMENTS IN REPURCHASE
AND REVERSE REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS
On June 27, 1985, the SEC proposed an amendment to rule 408 of regula-
tion S-X. 40 The proposal would require publicly held companies to provide
more information to investors and the Commission about investments in repur-
chase and reverse repurchase agreements if either (i) the aggregate carrying
amount of securities or other assets sold under repurchase agreements exceeds
ten percent of total assets or (ii) the amount at risk with one party exceeds five
percent of shareholders' equity. If either threshold is met, separate line disclo-
sure in a financial statement would be required of the amount the registrant has
invested in repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements. Additional footnote
disclosure would be required by the registrants on how they intend to perfect
their interests in securities underlying these agreements.
The proposal also sought comments on whether and how the SEC should
regulate new forms of financial transactions.
140. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6590, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,791 (June 27, 1985).
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THE PROGRESS OF EDGAR
EDGAR is the SEC's electronic data gathering analysis and retrieval proj-
ect.141 The EDGAR pilot project is currently accepting filings from approxi-
mately 150 volunteers. The SEC expects a substantial increase in the number of
volunteers before the system's operational stage begins in 1986. Although the
pilot project is now being funded by congressional appropriations, the Staff is
reviewing proposals to fund the operational system with private-sector fees to
make EDGAR partially or wholly self-sustaining. Typical filings currently
being accepted by EDGAR include 10-Ks, 10-Qs, 8-Ks, and registration
statements under the Exchange Act and the Securities Act. Recently, filings
have also been accepted under the Investment Act of 1940 and the Public
Utilities Act of 1935.
Documents are filed in one of three ways: direct transmission over phone
lines, delivery of magnetic tape, or delivery of a diskette. At this time, over
seventy-five kinds of word processors and personal computers are compatible
with the EDGAR system. In addition, electronic mail capabilities exist for
transmitting comments between filers and the SEC.
The SEC believes that the EDGAR pilot system, as it now stands, is an
improvement over the manual filing system for three reasons: (i) acceptance,
and in some cases effectiveness, is faster; (ii) review is more efficient since the
Staff has quicker access to filings and external data bases (criteria for and
probability of review remain unchanged); and (iii) upon acceptance, dissemina-
tion of electronic filings to EDGAR terminals in other cities is instantaneous.
Efficiencies in staff review (including eliminating the multiple copies re-
quired in manual filings) are being realized today. Although SEC public
reference rooms in New York, Chicago, and Washington, and the offices of state
securities law administrators in California, Georgia, and Wisconsin, already
have access to the EDGAR system, efficient dissemination depends on future
linking of the SEC Washington office with more regional offices of the SEC and
state securities administrations, exchanges, and private industry. The NASD is
expected to obtain access in the spring of 1986.
Efficiencies in filing can be realized once one masters the "Edgarization"
process. Edgarization is the process of putting a document in an electronic
format acceptable to the EDGAR system. Some users have expressed reserva-
tions about the current state of the art for filing substantial documents, like S-1
registration statements. This process usually requires use of a commercial
printer with the software to "Edgarize" the document efficiently. A representa-
tive of General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), the most frequent
user, suggests that the answer to filing problems is for participants to transmit
141. The information in this section is derived from discussions with volnteer,' the SEC staff,
and a brochure authored by the SEC, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Electronic Filing
Has the Potential To Revolutionize the Method Under Which Investment Decisions Are Made and
Executed (1985). For additional information, see the testimony of the Commission concerning
EDGAR before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Energy and
Commerce Committee (March 14, 1985).
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directly, using their own computer software and telephone lines. The Staff is
developing procedures to simplify and accelerate filing of complex documents.
Recently, in order to assure prompt effectiveness of a registration, the EDGAR
branch permitted an issuer filing a Form S-1 registration statement to file the
pricing amendment in two parts: part A, the bulk of the registration statement,
was filed in advance, and part B, the few pages affected by the pricing
information, was filed on the morning of the requested effective date.
Among the more immediate plans for the system are expansion of communi-
cations to facilitate acceptance of different kinds of filings; a program to give
additional state securities administrators access to filings on the EDGAR
system; cooperative efforts with the nation's securities exchanges; and increased
access to external data bases to improve efficiency of review and comment.
One-stop filing by registrants is the ultimate goal. The five-year goals are
industry-wide implementation, including access by all national securities ex-
changes; the addition of other Commission filings to the system; the instantane-
ous availability of all filings to the public; and the availability of raw data from
the EDGAR system through vendors who would, for a fee, provide access to all
filed data and data analyses tailored to specific investment objectives. By the end
of the decade, the Commission expects to make filing by all registrants manda-
tory.

